A New Group Decision Making Method with Distributed Indeterminacy Form under Neutrosophic Environment: Neutrosophic Social Choice Theory

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Abstract. This paper presents a novel social choice theory based multicriteria decision method under neutrosophic environment. Our hybrid method consists of classical methods and an aggregation operator used in social choice theory. In addition to this, we also use distributed indeterminacy form function in our method to provide a more sensitive indeterminacy approach towards accuracy functions. We also consider reciprocal property for all individuals. This provides, as in intuitionistic fuzzy decision making theory, a consistent decision making for each individual. The solution approach presented in this paper in group decision making is treated under neutrosophic individual preference relations. These new approaches seem to be more consistent with natural human behaviour, hence should be more acceptable and implementable. Moreover, the use of a similar approach to develop some deeper soft degrees of consensus is outlined. Finally, we give a Python implementation of our work in the Appendix section.

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Keywords. Neutrosophic logic, group decision making, neutrosophic preference relations, distributed indeterminacy form, social choice theory, neutrosophic social choice theory.
1. Introduction

In classical set theory, an element either belongs or does not belong to the set, as the membership of elements in a set is interpreted in binary terms according to a divalent case. In fuzzy set theory, introduced by Zadeh [1], the gradual assessment of the membership of elements in a set is permitted by a membership function valued in the real unit interval $[0, 1]$. In fuzzy set theory, classical divergent sets are usually called crisp sets. Fuzzy set theory is a generalization of the classical set theory. Intuitionistic fuzzy sets are sets whose elements have degrees of membership and non-membership. Intuitionistic fuzzy sets have been introduced by Atanassov [2] as an extension of the notion of fuzzy set, which itself extends the classical notion of a set. Neutrosophic set theory is a generalization of the intuitionistic set, classical set, fuzzy set, paraconsistent set, dialetheist set, paradoxist set, tautological set based on Neutrosophy [3]. An element $x(T, I, F)$ belongs to the set in the following way: it is true in the set with a degree of $t \in [0, 1]$, indeterminate with a degree of $i \in [0, 1]$, and it is false with a degree of $f \in [0, 1]$. Especially recently, neutrosophy found a significant degree of applications and attracted attention. Ye [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19], Lui and his colleagues [20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28], Biswas and his colleagues [29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35], Mondal and his colleagues [36, 38, 39, 40], Zang and his colleagues [41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47] published many papers containing significant and innovative methods on decision making under neutrosophic environment.

In our work, we determine rational social choice solely by the preferences of individuals in a society. A rational choice is possible only if every individual in the society is rational. Social choice theory investigates solutions to the problem of making a collective decision on a fair and democratic ground. The main purpose and subject area of social choice theory is to study the decision making problem for collectives to make a collective decision in a democratic manner. Of course our main concern will be to devise a method to make a cumulative decision rather than judging how fair the decisions of individuals are. The collective decision will manifest itself in neutrosophic values that the individuals assign for the preferences. Every individual is assumed to be able to assign to every preference some neutrosophic comparison value as pairs. We benefit from fuzzy and intuitionistic fuzzy social choice in solving the decision problems concerning neutrosophic social choice. Some of the most well known works in fuzzy social choice and fuzzy decision making can be found in [48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53]. For the intuitionistic fuzzy choice, we refer the reader to [54, 55, 56]. Many of the computational social choice theories that have been studied are based on rational individuals and their consistent preferences. Knowing the fact that the consistency of these pairwise comparisons forms the main theme, such theories devise appropriate methods based on the winner of the consensus of the group or based on an ordering of preferences with respect to a priority as a result of the voting of each individual. In any social choice, the consensus winner is defined as the choice
of the dominant individual or the collective decision of rational individuals. The goal is to determine the best preference picked by the group. For the fuzzy solutions of finding a consensus, we refer the reader to Kacprzyk and Nurmi [57]. We introduce a mathematical model for determining a consensus winner after a collective decision, in case there is any In case of otherwise, we present a model which orders the preferences with respect to their weights. We also give an example the last part of the paper to explain the model better.

2. Fundamental definitions

Here, we give some definitions of fundamental concepts related to our study scope such as fuzzy set, intuitionistic fuzzy set (IFS), neutrosophic set and single-valued neutrosophic set.

**Definition 2.1.** [1] Given a universal set $U$, with a generic element denoted by $x$, a fuzzy set $X$ in $U$ is a defined as a set of ordered pairs:

$$X = \{(x, \mu_X(x)) | x \in U\}$$

where $\mu_X : U \rightarrow [0,1]$ is called the membership function of $A$ and $\mu_X(x)$ represents the degree of membership of the element $x$ in $X$.

**Definition 2.2.** [2] An intuitionistic fuzzy set $X$ over a universe of discourse $U$ is represented as:

$$X = \{(x, \mu_X(x), \nu_X(x)) | x \in U\}$$

where $\mu_X : U \rightarrow [0,1]$ and $\nu_X : U \rightarrow [0,1]$ are called respectively the membership function of $A$ and the non-membership function of $A$ for $x$ in $X$. The degree of non-membership of the element $x$ in $X$ is normally defined as $\mu_X(x) = 1 - \nu_X(x)$.

**Definition 2.3.** [3, 4] Let $U$ be a universe of discourse, then a neutrosophic set is defined as:

$$N = \{(x, T(x), I(x), F(x)) : x \in U\}$$

which is identified by a truth-membership function $T_N : U \rightarrow [0^{-}, 1^{+}]$, indeterminacy-membership function $I_N : U \rightarrow [0^{-}, 1^{+}]$ and falsity-membership function $F_N : U \rightarrow [0^{-}, 1^{+}]$.

**Definition 2.4.** [3, 4] Let $U$ be a universe of discourse, then a single valued neutrosophic set is defined as:

$$N = \{(x, T(x), I(x), F(x)) : x \in U\}$$

where, a truth-membership function $T_N : U \rightarrow [0, 1]$, indeterminacy-membership function $I_N : U \rightarrow [0, 1]$ and falsity-membership function $F_N : U \rightarrow [0, 1]$ with $0 \leq T_N(x) + I_N(x) + F_N(x) \leq 3$. A single-valued neutrosophic number (SVNN) is denoted by $a = (T, I, F)$.

**Definition 2.5.** [5] Let $a$ be a single-valued neutrosophic number, an accuracy function $H$ of a single-valued neutrosophic number can be represented as follows:
where for all $a$, $H(a) \in [0, 1]$. $H$ is a order relation which gives an accuracy score of information of $a$. If $H(a_1) = H(a_2)$, then $a_1 = a_2$, that is, they have the same information. If $H(a_1) < H(a_2)$, then $a_2$ is larger than $a_1$, denoted by $a_1 < a_2$.

3. Accuracy function and distributed indeterminacy form

We would like to discuss the accuracy function $H$ used so far in almost all papers in neutrosophic studies. For a neutrosophic value, the accuracy function $H$ is calculated by the values $T$, $I$ and $F$. However, in a process of making a decision, such independent values may not yield results consistent with the decision-making process on objects. Suppose, one has truth, falsity and indeterminacy applied on a concept (or idea). We can not speak about these truth values by eliminating the indeterminacy. The reason is that we make a decision on the basis of including indeterminacy and the truth-maker gives the values by taking into account the indeterminacy. Sorensen [58, 59, 60], who published some papers on truth-maker theory, buries the theory of indeterminacy in the truth-maker theory. In a similar approach, we desire to calculate the the accuracy function by considering the indeterminacy as dependent on $T$ and $F$. The direct application of this idea to neutrosophic decision making helps us to approximate the outcomes with a better precision by distributing the indeterminacy on neutrosophic values. Let $H$ be an accuracy function. This time we reflect the indeterminacy value on the truth and falsity values by the following way: let $a = (T_a, I_a, F_a)$ be a single valued neutrosophic number with truth value $T_a$, indeterminacy value $I_a$, and falsity value $F_a$. Distributed Indeterminacy Form (DIF) of $a$ is $a_{DIF} = (T_a - T_a I_a, 0, F_a - F_a I_a)$. Here, we distribute indeterminacy effect on truth and falsity. In other words, we decrease the power of truth and falsity in proportion to the magnitude of indeterminacy. Our aim here is to determine how the value of truth and falsity is affected by the growth of indeterminacy. We give an example to an accuracy function $H$. Despite that $H(0.5, 0.5, 0.6) = 0.475$, we have that $H(0.5, 0.6, 0.6) = 0.48$. In other words, even though the precision should have been decreased when the indeterminacy increases, we observe here the opposite. This at first might seem contradictory but the situation will become clear in a moment. Therefore, DIF gives us a method to keep a neutrosophic number as least as possible in the ordering of the preferences in proportional to the increment of the indeterminacy value, provided that the truth or falsity values are fixed.

**Self Comparison.** Any comparisons on the same alternative should be assigned as an balanced value by rational individuals. The values $0.5$, $(0.5, 0.5)$, and $(0.5, 0.5, 0.5)$ are assigned respectively for self-comparison by individuals in fuzzy set, intuitionistic fuzzy set and neutrosophic set. Assigned self
4. Reciprocal property and hesitation function

4.1. Reciprocal property in fuzzy theory

A fuzzy preference relation \( R = (r_{ij}) \) on a finite set of alternatives \( X \) is a relation in \( X \times X \) that is characterised by a membership function \( \mu_R : X \times X \rightarrow [0,1] \). Pairwise comparisons concentrate simply on two alternatives at a time which enable individuals when expressing their preferences. If an individual prefers an alternative \( x_i \) to another alternative \( x_j \), then she/he should not simultaneously prefers \( x_j \) to \( x_i \). Then, the comparison outcomes preference of an alternative numerical representation into a reciprocal preference relation \( R \) is:

\[
\begin{align*}
    r_{ij} = 1 & \iff x_i > x_j \\
    r_{ij} = 0 & \iff x_j > x_i \\
    r_{ij} = 0.5 & \iff x_j \sim x_i
\end{align*}
\]

Binary crisp preference relations or \([0,1]\)-valued (fuzzy) preference relations are used in fuzzy social choice theory. \( x_{ij} = 1 \) shows the absolute degree of preference for \( x_i \) over \( x_j \). A definite preference for \( x_i \) over \( x_j \) is \( r_{ij} \in (0.5,1) \). Indifference between \( x_i \) and \( x_j \) is \( r_{ij} = 0.5 \). Reciprocal \([0,1]\)-valued relations \( \bar{R} = (\bar{r}_{ij}; \forall i, j : 0 \leq r_{ij} \leq 1, r_{ij} + r_{ji} = 1) \) are constantly used in fuzzy set theory for representing preferences.

4.2. Reciprocal property and hesitation function in intuitionistic fuzzy theory

An intuitionistic fuzzy preference relation \( P \) on a finite set of alternatives \( X = \{x_1, ..., x_n\} \) is characterised by a membership function \( \mu_P : X \times X \rightarrow [0,1] \) and a non-membership function \( \nu_P : X \times X \rightarrow [0,1] \) such that \( 0 \leq \mu_P(x_i, x_j) + \nu_P(x_i, x_j) \leq 1, \forall (x_i, x_j) \in X \times X \). As is in a fuzzy preference relation, an intuitionistic fuzzy preference relation is represented by a matrix \( P = (p_{ij}) \) with \( p_{ij} = < \mu_{ij}, \nu_{ij} >, \forall i, j = 1, 2, ..., n \). Obviously, when the hesitation function is the null function we have that \( \mu_{ij} + \nu_{ij} = 1 (\forall i, j) \) and the
intuitionistic fuzzy preference relation \( P = (p_{ij}) \) is mathematically equivalent to the reciprocal fuzzy preference relation \( R = (r_{ij}) \), with \( r_{ij} = \mu_{ij} \). An intuitionistic fuzzy preference relation is referred to as reciprocal when the following additional conditions are imposed:

(i) \( \mu_{ii} = \nu_{ii} = 0.5, \forall i \in \{1, ..., n\} \).

(ii) \( \mu_{ij} = \nu_{ji}, \forall i, j \in \{1, ..., n\} \).

In intuitionistic fuzzy studies, the relations do not have to have reciprocity but must satisfy \( r_{ij} \leq 1 - r_{ji} \) due to intuitionistic index. In other words, for an IFS \( A, \pi_A(x) \) determined by the following expression: \( \pi_A(x) = 1 - \mu_A(x) - \nu_A(x) \) is called the hesitancy degree of the element \( x \in X \) to the set \( A \), and \( \pi_A(x) \in [0, 1], \forall x \in X \).

4.3. Reciprocal property and hesitation function in neutrosophy theory

Let \( S = \{s_1, s_2, s_3, ..., s_n\} \) be a set of alternatives (or options) and \( m \) be set of individuals. Each individual declares his or her own preferences over \( S \) which are represented by an individual neutrosophic preference relation \( R_k \) such that:

\[
N_{R_k} : S \times S \mapsto [0, 1] \times [0, 1] \times [0, 1]
\]

which is traditionally represented by a matrix \( R_k = [r_{ij}^k = N_{R_k}(r_{i}^k, r_{j}^k)], i, j = 1, 2, 3, ..., n; k = 1, 2, 3, ..., m. \)

\[
R_k = \begin{bmatrix}
(0.5, 0.5, 0.5) & r_{12}^k & r_{13}^k & r_{14}^k \\
(0.5, 0.5, 0.5) & r_{21}^k & r_{23}^k & r_{24}^k \\
(0.5, 0.5, 0.5) & r_{31}^k & r_{32}^k & r_{33}^k \\
(0.5, 0.5, 0.5) & r_{41}^k & r_{42}^k & r_{43}^k & r_{44}^k
\end{bmatrix}
\]

The matrix above shows that neutrosophic preferences of an individual \( k \) among \( s_1, s_2, s_3, s_4 \). \( N_{R_k}(s_1, s_1) = N_{R_k}(s_2, s_2) = N_{R_k}(s_3, s_3) = N_{R_k}(s_4, s_4) = (0.5, 0.5, 0.5), N_{R_k}(s_1, s_2) = r_{12}^k, N_{R_k}(s_3, s_4) = r_{34}^k, ... \) etc. Our assumption requires that there is no largeness when an alternative compares to itself. Almost all the research on decision making do not assign any value or assign zero degree in their underlying discourse for self-comparisons. We follow a completely computational approach in this study. On the other hand, zeros given in previous studies may lead us to a false perception to compare any \( s_i \). If a neutrosophic preference function \( mu, mu(s_i, s_j) = 0 \), then \( s_i \) is definitely larger than \( s_j \). If we had a rational individual, \( mu(s_i, s_i) \) would have
been 0.5, because if we do self-comparison, an alternative can not have any advantage or different information over itself. We use $H$ function in Definition 2.5 for both accuracy and to be a neutrosophic index of SVNNs. If $i = j$, then we take $N_{R_k}(s_i, s_j)$ to be $(0.5, 0.5, 0.5)$ without DIF, and $(0.5, 0.5)$ with DIF. So, we have the following matrix:

$$R_k = \begin{bmatrix} (0.5, 0, 0.5) & r_{12}^k & r_{13}^k & r_{14}^k \\ r_{21}^k & (0.5, 0, 0.5) & r_{23}^k & r_{24}^k \\ r_{31}^k & r_{32}^k & (0.5, 0, 0.5) & r_{33}^k \\ r_{41}^k & r_{42}^k & r_{43}^k & (0.5, 0, 0.5) \end{bmatrix}$$

The function $H$ (called neutrosophic index or neutrosophic hesitation function) assigns each $a_{ij}$ neutrosophic value to a number in $[0, 1]$. 

$$H(a_{ij}) = \frac{1 + T(a_{ij}) - I(a_{ij})(1 - T(a_{ij})) - F(a_{ij})(1 - I(a_{ij}))}{2}$$

Now, we have a new matrix, $R_k^H = [H(r_{ij}^k) = H^k(N_{R_k}(s_i, s_j))]$ where $i, j = 1, 2, 3, ..., n; k = 1, 2, 3, ..., m$. With a more explicit expression,

$$R_k^H = \begin{bmatrix} H((0.5, 0, 0.5)) & H(r_{12}^k) & H(r_{13}^k) & H(r_{14}^k) \\ H(r_{21}^k) & H((0.5, 0, 0.5)) & H(r_{23}^k) & H(r_{24}^k) \\ H(r_{31}^k) & H(r_{32}^k) & H((0.5, 0, 0.5)) & H(r_{34}^k) \\ H(r_{41}^k) & H(r_{42}^k) & H(r_{43}^k) & H((0.5, 0, 0.5)) \end{bmatrix}$$

We find more appropriate to use the notion of hesitation in order to have consistency between the choosers (individuals) and the chooser’s preference. Here, we benefit from the intuitionistic fuzzy sets (IFS). In utilizing IFS, we provide a hybrid account of the neutrosophic accuracy function by hesitation. Here, we will adapt intuitionistic index to our study since we will be using the function $H$ as a solid index throughout the paper. Not every $H^k(r_{ij})$ need to be reciprocal, i.e. $H^k(r_{ij}) \neq 1 - H^k(r_{ji})$ but should be quasi-reciprocal. That is, $H(r_{ij}^k) \leq 1 - H(r_{ji}^k)$, for each $i, j = 1,..., n$. If $k$ is not quasi-reciprocal, we call $k$ is not a rational individual. That is, $k$ is an irrational individual. If $i = j$, then we just take $N_{R_k}(a_i, a_j) = (0.5, 0.5, 0.5)$ because $H((0.5, 0.5, 0.5)) = 0.5$ irrespective of DIF of neutrosophic numbers. Furthermore, when we consider DIF, for information for a rational individual on the same preference is $(0.5, 0.5)$ from now on, and $H((0.5, 0.5)) = 0.5$
as desired.

$$DIF(R_k) = \begin{bmatrix}
(0.5, 0, 0.5) & DIF(r_{12}^k) & DIF(r_{13}^k) & DIF(r_{14}^k) \\
DIF(r_{21}^k) & (0.5, 0, 0.5) & DIF(r_{23}^k) & DIF(r_{24}^k) \\
DIF(r_{31}^k) & DIF(r_{32}^k) & (0.5, 0, 0.5) & DIF(r_{33}^k) \\
DIF(r_{41}^k) & DIF(r_{42}^k) & DIF(r_{43}^k) & (0.5, 0, 0.5)
\end{bmatrix}$$

$R_i$: preference matrix of $i$th individual,

$DIF(R_i)$: DIF of preference matrix of $i$th individual,

$R_i^H$: range of preference matrix of $i$th individual under $H$ function,

$r_{Hk}^i(ij)$: represents the element at the row $i$ and column $j$ of $R_i^H$ for individual $k$

$h_{k}^{ij}$: distribution of individual $k$’s votes for each pairwise comparison of alternative’s value is determined by the size from $0.5$ obtained from $R_i^H$,

$[[h_{k}]]$: the matrix obtained by each element of $h_{k}^{ij}$,

$[[H_{ij}]]$: matrix of the group vote,

$A_k$: the degree for preference $k$ assigned by the group,

$a_{ij}^{k}$: majority determination value for preference $k$ from the group (the element at the row $i$ and column $j$ of $[[h_{k}]]$),

$H_{ij}^{k}$: majority determination value for preference $k$ from the group under $H$ function,

$H_{\pi ij}$: average majority determination value of the group under $H$ function,

$H_{\pi}$: consensus winner determination matrix,

$C(s_i)$: social aggregation function for alternative (preference) $s_i$, 
Practical Example 4.1. Suppose that there are three experts $m_1, m_2, m_3$ and four facilities $s_1, s_2, s_3, s_4$ in the same business industry. We assume that all experts are rational and so we consider all neutrosophic values satisfy quasi-reciprocal property. We also assume the self-comparison value to be $(0.5, 0, 0.5)$. Each expert assigns his/her neutrosophic opinion value by comparing the facilities in pairs as follows:

$R_{m_i}$ is the set of assigned values (preferences of ) by $m_i$ to pairs in the facilities where $1 \leq i \leq 3$.

$R_{m_1} = \{(s_1, s_1) = (0.5, 0, 0.5), (s_1, s_2) = (0.45, 0.24, 0.27), (s_1, s_3) = (0.31, 0.14, 0.66), (s_1, s_4) = (0.8, 0.3, 0), (s_2, s_1) = (0.1, 0.45, 0.52), (s_2, s_2) = (0.5, 0, 0.5), (s_2, s_3) = (0.48, 0.26, 0.37), (s_2, s_4) = (0.2, 0.7, 0.8), (s_3, s_1) = (0.61, 0.43, 0.71), (s_3, s_2) = (0.31, 0.71), (s_3, s_3) = (0.5, 0, 0.5), (s_3, s_4) = (0.76, 0.23, 0.27), (s_4, s_1) = (0.1, 0.6, 0.9), (s_4, s_2) = (0.81, 0.55, 0.33), (s_4, s_3) = (0.11, 0.32, 0.59), (s_4, s_4) = (0.5, 0, 0.5)\}$

$R_{m_2} = \{(s_1, s_1) = (0.5, 0, 0.5), (s_1, s_2) = (0.2, 0.4, 0.7), (s_1, s_3) = (0.21, 0.55, 0.95), (s_1, s_4) = (0.4, 0.5, 0.3), (s_2, s_1) = (0.29, 0.53, 0.38), (s_2, s_2) = (0.5, 0, 0.5), (s_2, s_3) = (0.62, 0.45, 0.16), (s_2, s_4) = (0.2, 0.7, 0.8), (s_3, s_1) = (0.72, 0.15, 0.18), (s_3, s_2) = (0.11, 0.13, 0.79), (s_3, s_3) = (0.5, 0, 0.5), (s_3, s_4) = (0.51, 0.45, 0.53), (s_4, s_1) = (0.15, 0.35, 0.23), (s_4, s_2) = (0.81, 0.55, 0.33), (s_4, s_3) = (0.17, 0.57, 0.36), (s_4, s_4) = (0.5, 0, 0.5)\}$

$R_{m_3} = \{(s_1, s_1) = (0.5, 0, 0.5), (s_1, s_2) = (0.3, 0.45, 0.7), (s_1, s_3) = (0.1, 0.85, 0.78), (s_1, s_4) = (0.4, 0.5, 0.3), (s_2, s_1) = (0.36, 0.51, 0.39), (s_2, s_2) = (0.5, 0, 0.5), (s_2, s_3) = (0.62, 0.45, 0.16), (s_2, s_4) = (0.1, 0.8, 0.21), (s_3, s_1) = (0.92, 0.1, 0.16), (s_3, s_2) = (0.11, 0.13, 0.79), (s_3, s_3) = (0.5, 0, 0.5), (s_3, s_4) = (0.23, 0.45, 0.74), (s_4, s_1) = (0.15, 0.35, 0.23), (s_4, s_2) = (0.6, 0.2, 0.1), (s_4, s_3) = (0.57, 0.57, 0.36), (s_4, s_4) = (0.5, 0, 0.5)\}$

$R_{m_4} = \{(s_1, s_1) = (0.5, 0, 0.5), (s_1, s_2) = (0.2, 0.4, 0.7), (s_1, s_3) = (0.25, 0.87, 0.38), (s_1, s_4) = (0.4, 0.5, 0.3), (s_2, s_1) = (0.29, 0.53, 0.38), (s_2, s_2) = (0.5, 0, 0.5), (s_2, s_3) = (0.62, 0.45, 0.16), (s_2, s_4) = (0.34, 0.66, 0.21), (s_3, s_1) = (0.73, 0.87, 0.56), (s_3, s_2) = (0.14, 0.19, 0.79), (s_3, s_3) = (0.5, 0, 0.5), (s_3, s_4) = (0.21, 0.45, 0.66), (s_4, s_1) = (0.16, 0.35, 0.23), (s_4, s_2) = (0.6, 0.4, 0.8), (s_4, s_3) = (0.68, 0.57, 0.36), (s_4, s_4) = (0.5, 0, 0.5)\}$

We now represent each $R_{m_i}$ in matrix form and then calculate their distributed indeterminacy forms $DIF(R_{m_i})$.

$$R_{m_1} = \begin{bmatrix} (0.5, 0, 0.5) & (0.45, 0.24, 0.27) & (0.31, 0.14, 0.66) & (0.8, 0.3, 0) \\ (0.1, 0.45, 0.52) & (0.5, 0, 0.5) & (0.48, 0.26, 0.37) & (0.2, 0.7, 0.8) \\ (0.61, 0.43, 0.71) & (0.31, 0, 0.71) & (0.5, 0, 0.5) & (0.76, 0.23, 0.27) \\ (0.1, 0.6, 0.9) & (0.81, 0.55, 0.33) & (0.11, 0.32, 0.59) & (0.5, 0, 0.5) \end{bmatrix}$$
Now we apply $H$ function to $DIF(R_i)$ and then obtain $R_i^H$.

$$R_{m1}^H = \begin{bmatrix} 0.5 & 0.5684 & 0.3495 & 0.78 \\ 0.3844 & 0.5 & 0.5407 & 0.41 \\ 0.4715 & 0.3 & 0.5 & 0.6886 \\ 0.34 & 0.608 & 0.3368 & 0.5 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$h_{m1}^{m1}(ij) = \begin{cases} 1, & r_{m1}^{m1}(ij) > 0.5 \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$
\[
[h^1] = \begin{bmatrix}
0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 0
\end{bmatrix}
\]

\[
R^H_{m_2} = \begin{bmatrix}
0.5 & 0.35 & 0.3335 & 0.525 \\
0.4788 & 0.5 & 0.6265 & 0.41 \\
0.7295 & 0.2041 & 0.5 & 0.4945 \\
0.474 & 0.474 & 0.4591 & 0.5
\end{bmatrix}
\]

\[
h^{m_2}(ij) = \begin{cases} 
1, & r^H_{m_2}(ij) > 0.5 \\
0, & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

\[
[h^2] = \begin{bmatrix}
0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0
\end{bmatrix}
\]

\[
R^H_{m_3} = \begin{bmatrix}
0.5 & 0.39 & 0.6234 & 0.525 \\
0.4926 & 0.5 & 0.6265 & 0.5675 \\
0.5399 & 0.2041 & 0.5 & 0.35975 \\
0.474 & 0.4399 & 0.54515 & 0.5
\end{bmatrix}
\]

\[
h^{m_3}(ij) = \begin{cases} 
1, & r^H_{m_3}(ij) > 0.5 \\
0, & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

\[
[h^3] = \begin{bmatrix}
0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 0
\end{bmatrix}
\]

\[
R^H_{m_4} = \begin{bmatrix}
0.5 & 0.35 & 0.5422 & 0.525 \\
0.4788 & 0.5 & 0.6265 & 0.5221 \\
0.511 & 0.2367 & 0.5 & 0.3762 \\
0.477 & 0.439 & 0.5688 & 0.5
\end{bmatrix}
\]

\[
h^{m_4}(ij) = \begin{cases} 
1, & r^H_{m_4}(ij) > 0.5 \\
0, & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]
The next step is to collect and compare the preferences. To do this, we sum the columns of $[H_{ij}]$ and divide it to number of the alternatives.

$$A_k = \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i}[[H_{ik}]]$$

where $1 \leq k \leq m$

$$H_{\pi ij} = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{m} \sum_{k=1}^{m} a_{ij}^k, & i \neq j \\ 0, & i = j \end{cases}$$

where $i, j = 1, 2, \ldots n$ and $k = 1, 2, \ldots m$.

$$H_{\pi 12} = \frac{a_{12}^{m_1} + a_{12}^{m_2} + a_{12}^{m_3} + a_{12}^{m_4}}{4} = \frac{1 + 0 + 0 + 0}{4} = \frac{1}{4},$$

$$H_{\pi 13} = \frac{1}{2}, H_{\pi 14} = 1, H_{\pi 21} = 0, H_{\pi 23} = 1, H_{\pi 24} = \frac{1}{2}, H_{\pi 31} = \frac{3}{4}, H_{\pi 32} = 0,$$

$$H_{\pi 34} = \frac{1}{2}, H_{\pi 41} = 0, H_{\pi 42} = \frac{1}{4}, H_{\pi 43} = \frac{1}{2}$$

We now define the notion of a consensus winner.

**Definition 4.2.** $s_i \in W$ is called a consensus winner if and only if $\forall s_j \neq s_i : r_{ij} > 0.5$, where $r_{ij} \in H_{\pi}$.

In our example above, there is no winner. Of course, it is easy to define that $\alpha-$consensus winner and others. So, we propose a social aggregation average function to calculate the order of $s_i$ in the group is the extent to which individuals is not against option $s_i$.
\[ C(s_i) = \frac{1}{m-1} \sum_{i \neq j} r_{ij}, \text{ where } i, j = 1, 2, \ldots, m. \]

\[ C(s_1) = \frac{3}{16}, \quad C(s_2) = \frac{1}{16}, \quad C(s_3) = \frac{9}{16}, \quad C(s_4) = \frac{6}{16}. \]

Then, \( C(s_3) > C(s_4) > C(s_1) > C(s_2). \)

5. Conclusion

The main aim of this paper is to bring into attention the interplay between neutrosophy and social choice theory. Within the framework of this intention, we have taken inheritance from the studies of fuzzy and intuitionistic fuzzy social choice theory and developed the neutrosophic based social choice theory. First we defined the DIF, which was used in Sorensen’s truth-maker theory to distribute the indeterminacy on truth and falsity for neutrosophic calculations. We believe that the notion of DIF will give a new breath and different perspectives for neutrosophic studies. Through DIF, we emphasize both hesitation and reciprocal characteristics in self-comparisons and other pairwise comparisons to make a consistent decision maker. We determine a consensus winner if any. In case of otherwise, we obtain orders of the given alternatives by defining a social aggregation average function. The implementation in Python, given in the Appendix, is an algorithm computing the output in the order of \( \frac{n}{11} \) seconds, where \( n \) is the input size (the number of matrices), when executed in a mid-end computer.

References


A Python implementation of the group decision making method with distributed indeterminacy form under neutrosophic environment is as follows:

```python
from __future__ import division
from collections import defaultdict
import math
import sys

R1=  
[  
  [(0.5,0,0.5),(0.45,0.24,0.27), (0.31,0.14,0.66) , (0.8,0.3,0)],
  [(0.1,0.45,0.52), (0.5,0,0.5) , (0.48,0.26,0.37), (0.2,0.7,0.8)],
  [(0.61,0.43,0.71), (0.31,0.07,1) , (0.5,0,0.5) , (0.76,0.23,0.27)],
  [(0.1,0.06,0.9) , (0.81,0.55,0.33) , (0.11,0.32,0.59) , (0.5,0,0.5)]
]

R2=  
[  
  [(0.5,0,0.5),(0.2,0.4,0.7), (0.21,0.55,0.96), (0.4,0.5,0.3)],
  [(0.29,0.53,0.38) , (0.5,0,0.5) , (0.62,0.46,0.16) , (0.2,0.7,0.8)],
  [(0.72,0.15,0.18) , (0.11,0.13,0.79) , (0.5,0,0.5) , (0.51,0.45,0.53)],
  [(0.15,0.35,0.23) , (0.81,0.55,0.33) , (0.17,0.57,0.36) , (0.5,0,0.5)]
]

R3=  
[  
  [(0.5,0,0.5),(0.3,0.45,0.7), (0.1,0.85,0.78) , (0.4,0.5,0.3)],
  [(0.36,0.51,0.39) , (0.5,0,0.5) , (0.62,0.45,0.16) , (0.1,0.8,0.21)],
  [(0.92,0.1,0.16) , (0.11,0.13,0.79) , (0.5,0,0.5) , (0.23,0.45,0.74)],
  [(0.15,0.35,0.23) , (0.6,0.2,0.1) , (0.57,0.57,0.36) , (0.5,0,0.5)]
]

R4=  
[  
  [(0.5,0,0.5),(0.2,0.4,0.7), (0.25,0.87,0.38) , (0.4,0.5,0.3)],
  [(0.29,0.53,0.38) , (0.5,0,0.5) , (0.62,0.45,0.16) , (0.34,0.66,0.21)],
  [(0.73,0.87,0.56) , (0.14,0.19,0.79) , (0.5,0,0.5) , (0.21,0.45,0.66)],
  [(0.16,0.35,0.23) , (0.6,0,4.0,8) , (0.68,0.57,0.36) , (0.5,0,0.5)]
]

AllTogether= {'R1': [(0.5,0,0.5),(0.45,0.24,0.27), (0.31,0.14,0.66) , (0.8,0.3,0)],
               [(0.1,0.45,0.52), (0.5,0,0.5) , (0.48,0.26,0.37), (0.2,0.7,0.8)],
               [(0.61,0.43,0.71), (0.31,0.07,1) , (0.5,0,0.5) , (0.76,0.23,0.27)],
               [(0.1,0.06,0.9) , (0.81,0.55,0.33) , (0.11,0.32,0.59) , (0.5,0,0.5)]},

'R2': [(0.5,0,0.5),(0.2,0.4,0.7), (0.21,0.55,0.96), (0.4,0.5,0.3)],
       [(0.29,0.53,0.38) , (0.5,0,0.5) , (0.62,0.45,0.16) , (0.2,0.7,0.8)],
       [(0.72,0.15,0.18) , (0.11,0.13,0.79) , (0.5,0,0.5) , (0.51,0.45,0.53)],
       [(0.15,0.35,0.23) , (0.6,0,4.0,8) , (0.57,0.57,0.36) , (0.5,0,0.5)]},

'R3': [(0.5,0,0.5),(0.3,0.45,0.7), (0.1,0.85,0.78) , (0.4,0.5,0.3)],
       [(0.36,0.51,0.39) , (0.5,0,0.5) , (0.62,0.45,0.16) , (0.1,0.8,0.21)],
       [(0.92,0.1,0.16) , (0.11,0.13,0.79) , (0.5,0,0.5) , (0.23,0.45,0.74)],
       [(0.15,0.35,0.23) , (0.6,0,4.0,8) , (0.57,0.57,0.36) , (0.5,0,0.5)]},

'R4': [(0.5,0,0.5),(0.2,0.4,0.7), (0.25,0.87,0.38) , (0.4,0.5,0.3)],
       [(0.29,0.53,0.38) , (0.5,0,0.5) , (0.62,0.45,0.16) , (0.34,0.66,0.21)],
       [(0.73,0.87,0.56) , (0.14,0.19,0.79) , (0.5,0,0.5) , (0.21,0.45,0.66)],
       [(0.16,0.35,0.23) , (0.6,0,4.0,8) , (0.68,0.57,0.36) , (0.5,0,0.5)]}

def AccuracyFunction(T,I,F):
    HV= (1+ T - I*(1-T)-F*(1-I))/2
    return HV

def DIF(T,I,F):
    T1=math.fabs(T-I*T)
    F1=math.fabs(F-I*F)
    DIFi=('('+str(T1)+','+str(0)+','+str(F1)+')')
    return DIFi

def AccuracyIntedeteminacyDistubition(T,I,F):
    T1=math.fabs(T-I*T)
    F1=math.fabs(F-I*F)
    ID=AccuracyFunction(T1,I,F1)
    return ID
```
def RationalityChecker(R):
    columnR=len(R)
    idn=0
    rowR=len(R[0])
    for i in range(0,rowR-1):
        if R[i][i] != (0.5, 0, 0.5):
            print f'({i},{i},") is not (0.5, 0, 0.5), so, s "{i}, " is not rational agent'
            idn=1
    for i in range(0,rowR):
        for j in range(0,rowR):
            if i != j:
                t1=R[i][j][0]
                i1=R[i][j][1]
                f1=R[i][j][2]
                A1=AccuracyIntedeterminacyDistubition(t1,i1,f1)
                t2=R[j][i][0]
                i2=R[j][i][1]
                f2=R[j][i][2]
                A2=AccuracyIntedeterminacyDistubition(t2,i2,f2)
                if A1 > 1-A2 : # A1 must be less than or equal to 1-A2
                    idn=1
                    print R[i][j], ' and ', R[j][i], ' does not satisfy hesitation property'
    return idn

def RHcreation(K):
    global RHtogether
    RHtogether= defaultdict()
    for i in K.keys():
        columnAll=len(K[i])
        rowAll1=len(K[i][0])
        rowAll2=len(K[i][0])
        for j in range(0,rowAll1):
            for k in range(0,rowAll2):
                t1=K[i][j][k][0]
                i1=K[i][j][k][1]
                f1=K[i][j][k][2]
                A=AccuracyIntedeterminacyDistubition(t1,i1,f1)
                if i not in RHtogether.keys():
                    RHtogether[i]=[A]
                else:
                    RHtogether[i].extend([A])
        number= int(math.sqrt(len(RHtogether[i])))
        m=0
        new_list=[]
        while m<len(RHtogether[i]):
            new_list.append( RHtogether[i][m:m + number])
            m+= number
        RHtogether[i]=new_list
    return RHtogether
def OneZero(K):
    global H
    H=defaultdict()
    for i in K.keys():
        columnAllin=len(K[i])
        rowAll=0
        for j in range(0,columnAllin):
            for k in range(0,rowAll):
                if K[i][j][k]>0.5:
                    if i not in H:
                        H[i]=[1]
                    else:
                        H[i].append(1)
                else:
                    if i not in H:
                        H[i]=[0]
                    else:
                        H[i].append(0)
        number= int(math.sqrt(len(H[i])))
        m=0
        while m<len(H[i]):
            new_list=[]
            m+= number
            H[i]=new_list
        return H

def H_pi_ij(K):
    global Hpij
    Hpij= defaultdict()
    columnAllin112=len(H)
    for i in range(0,columnAllin112):
        for j in range(0,columnAllin112):
            Topij=0
            for k in H.keys():
                if i != j:
                    Topij = Topij + H[k][i][j]
                else:
                    Topij=0
            aij=str(i+1)+str(j+1)
            TopijAverage= Topij/len(H)
            if aij not in Hpij.keys():
                TopijAverage= Topij/len(H)
            else:
                Hpij[aij]=TopijAverage
    return Hpij

def Alternative_Ordinary(Hpij):
    global ORD
    ORD= defaultdict()
    Number_Of_Alternatives=int(math.sqrt(len(Hpij)))
    for i in range(1,Number_Of_Alternatives+1):
        istr=str(i)
        Top=0
        for k in Hpij.keys():
if istr==k[1]:
    Top=Top+Hpij[k]
TopJavarage= Top/Number_Of_Alternatives

if istr not in ORD.keys():
    istA='Alternative '+istr
    ORD[istA]=TopJavarage
else:
    ORD[istA]=TopJavarage
return ORD

def GroupDecisionWithID(m):
    for i in AllTogether.keys():
        if RationalityChecker(AllTogether[i])==1:
            print 'inconsistent agent'
Step1=RHcreation(m)
Step2=OneZero(Step1)
Step3=H_pi_ij(Step2)
Step4=Alternative_Ordinary(Step3)
return Step4
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