Game-Theoretic Neutrosophic Models for College Fine Arts Education Evaluation

Abstract

Assessing Fine Arts education involves multiple stakeholders whose judgments 
are often conflicting, subjective, and uncertain. Conventional evaluation methods cannot 
represent such ambiguity. This paper develops a Neutrosophic Game-Theoretic model 
where students, instructors, and critics are treated as strategic players. Payoffs are 
expressed as neutrosophic triples (T, I, F), capturing degrees of support, indeterminacy, 
and opposition. We define a Neutrosophic Payoff Matrix and extend the classical concept 
of equilibrium to a Neutrosophic Nash Equilibrium (NNE), reflecting stability under 
uncertain judgments. A case study on final-year project evaluations illustrates how the 
model reveals hidden conflicts, cooperative possibilities, and fairness issues. The 
proposed framework provides a mathematically rigorous and practically relevant 
approach to quality analysis in Fine Arts education. 

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.16934845